Company Mole: FBI and CIA Counterintelligence Action

Rachael Riggs

Henley-Putnam

National American University

Company Mole: FBI and CIA Counterintelligence Actions

The 1980s in the United States brought a lot more than rock bands and big hair. A mass amount of Top-Secret Intelligence had been sold by a few men for a lot of money. Three men individually, Edward Lee Howard, Robert Hanssen, and Aldrich Ames. Though never working together, these three men managed to sell and sell out almost every single Soviet Source that the United States had. Most of the revealed sources executed upon return to the Soviet Union. Besides gaining knowledge of all turned agents and clandestine operations, the Soviet Union also received the information of the United States technological intelligence, operations, and tradecraft. This knowledge allowed Russia to be one step ahead of the United States.

Aldrich Ames

Aldrich Ames had worked for the CIA since graduating from high school. He was in a counterintelligence position within the CIA that gave him access to classified information on past and present operational cases that involved Soviet Intelligence officers. On April 16, 1985, Ames would be unable to come back from his decisions. He went to the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. with a letter addressed to the most senior KGB officer in the embassy.

Aldrich Ames had given the names of a few Soviet agents that the CIA believed were controlled, double agents. He rationalized that he thought he was providing useless information. He then requested payment of $50,000 for the info. Initially, Ames intended to receive a one-time payment and be done. But after he received that first payment, his journey down a very dark road continued.

Through late 1985 and into 1986, Three of the highest regarded Soviet assets had been compromised and executed. The CIA at the time, had its focus on Edward Lee Howard, a former CIA employee that was confirmed to be working for Russia by one of the executed assets. After being questioned on this by the FBI, Howard escaped surveillance and relocated to Russia.

While the CIA had their focus on the Howard investigation, they realized that Howard had no knowledge or access to the information on the executed sources. Over 20 operations effectively ended, and Edward Lee Howard only knew of approximately 50% of them. (Maas, 1995)

The first move the CIA took was at the end of 1985. They had thought that Russia had potentially accessed the CIA's communications. They ran probes and found nothing. In January of 1986, they implemented "draconian measures," which limited employee access to Soviet Intelligence. The CIA director requested a review of each of the cases individually to find common entanglements.

In October of 1986, a four-person analytical group was created by the CIA. This task force was named "Special Task Force" (STF) and was a part of the counterintelligence division. The task force began analyzing the compromised cases and narrowing the suspect list down. They looked at who had been involved in the cases or had known about them, which employees had access to the information, and how many could be explained by inadequate operational procedures.

The FBI and the CIA began a working relationship to unveil the mole. The two agencies decided to start recruiting Russian sources to help in finding information. This recruitment started in 1987 and continued until 1994. After many meetings and review of the cases, an investigator had sifted through 90 potential suspects and had it narrowed down to ten. With nobody standing out, the investigation came to a standstill.

Ames often took large shopping bags full of classified documents out of his office without question. He received a polygraph before assignment in Rome, which stated that he was not honest about if he had ever been "pitched" by foreign intelligence. This information was not investigated further after Ames blew it off, saying that he was worried he might be approached while in Rome.

Ames became a person of interest when his lifestyle did not match his salary. He had purchased a $540,000 home, had new cars, and frequently went on trips. Those trips became of particular concern because they were not reported to the CIA, which as an employee, he was required to report all out of country trips. A routine financial inquiry made on Ames revealed large deposits in Ames' name, including transfers from a swiss bank account.

The CIA allowed Ames to remain in positions that allowed him access to highly classified information, and while he was under investigation, he remained in these secure areas.

By August of 1991, The CIA and FBI joint forces had now identified 198 CIA employees that had access to the 185-186 information and 29 that deserved priority attention, that to include Ames. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1994) With Ames having worked in the SE Division during that time and his unexplained wealth led to a full-on investigation into him as the mole.

In March of 1993, the joint task force set up electronic surveillance in Ames office as well as monitoring of his vehicle, wiretap of his phone lines and mail and trash cover. In June 1993, the FBI searched his office and found 144 classified documents, many of which did not pertain to his job. The financial investigation revealed that Ames had received over 1 million dollars that could not be accounted for. In November of 1993, Ames traveled to Bogota, Columbia to meet with his KGB contact. From that moment, constant surveillance began monitoring Ames. By the end of February 1994, Ames was supposed to fly to Moscow. The FBI realizing that putting off his flight might alert him to the investigation, they proceeded with an arrest. (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1994)

Edward Lee Howard

In 1983 Edward Lee Howard failed his polygraph examination due to petty theft and drug use. Because of this, the CIA forced Howard to resign. He and his wife had been trained to operate in Moscow as an undercover spy team. After he left, Howard held animosity toward the CIA and began selling information to Russia.

In 1985 Howard caught on that he was under investigation for espionage. He managed to elude FBI surveillance and defect to Russia, where he stayed for the remainder of his life. Edward had sold numerous amounts of information to the KGB. However, the damage of what he sold was in no comparison to that of Aldrich Ames. He kept the CIA and FBI's focus on him for much of the '80s up until the early '90s. During this time, a realization occurred that the damage couldn't have possibly come from Howard. Howard no longer worked for the CIA, and more accounts came forward that he would not have had knowledge. (Wise, 1986)

The problems associated with Howard's spying mostly became, that so much focus was placed on him being the mole. Because of this focus, the joint task force didn't focus thoroughly on any other person. At that time leaving Ames unnoticed for a substantial period. (Tavernise, 2002)

While most of the intelligence passed on to the KGB was due to Aldrich Ames, there was another source that was supplying large amounts of classified intel. His discovery would not occur for another seven years.

Robert Hanssen

Robert Hanssen became the supervisor of the FBI's technical squad in 1985. In his career he was never asked to submit to a polygraph, fill out a financial disclosure, and only one background investigation performed. Hanssen was happily married with six children and an Opus Dei Catholic. Although he was a quiet, awkward type, in all appearances, he seemed like an average man that was devoted to his family and church. Behind the scenes, however, he led a secret life that was destined to end with tragic consequences. (Fine, 2003)

Hanssen was one of the FBI's best computer and technology experts. In every job that he held while working at the FBI, he could hack into and use the FBI database without any person monitoring his activities. He was able to get into any classified information that he desired and search for himself to see if he was under investigation. (Shannon, 2002)

Robert's obsession with espionage began when he was young. This obsession was likely the reason that he decided to conspire with the Russian's. Another likely reason was that the money helped get his children through schooling. Whatever the reason, Hanssen chose to partake in spying for his selfish benefit against his own country and the organization for which he worked. This choice that he had made over 20 years would ultimately lead to his arrest in 2001. (Vise, 2002)

The offensive and defensive measures taken by the CIA and the FBI

In the above examples, the FBI and the CIA had to make extensive counterintelligence measures to find the culprit. Defensively the FBI during that time was based on the trust of their employees. The FBI did an initial background investigation upon hiring Hanssen. However, they did not pursue any further re-investigations, polygraphs, or financial disclosures on employees. They also did not perform audits or monitoring of computers. The FBI had no document or computer security. (Fine, 2003) Defensive security measures from the '80s until Robert Hanssen's arrest in 2001 were close to non-existent. His arrest would lead the FBI to implement better defensive tactics.

Offensively the FBI and CIA put together investigative units and started investigations. When these agencies had the suspects narrowed down, they began their investigations with measures such as:

• they pulled financial information
• they installed GPS and beacons on vehicles
• wiretapped phones
• devised trash covers
• clandestinely installed cameras in the residence of suspects
• maintained constant physical and electronic surveillance
• bugged suspects homes with listening devices
• performed physical and electronic searches
• they used HUMINT sources
• interviewed people close to the suspects
• polygraph examinations
• conducted background re-investigations
• In the case of Robert Hanssen, the FBI falsified the entire FBI database and created a false job as a promotion that was in reality demoting Hanssen and removing his ability to view classified documents.

Robert Hanssen, Aldrich "Rick" Ames, and Edward Lee Howard all were involved in multiple sources that were disclosed to Russia. It is hard to narrow it down to whom was responsible for which case, it likely was that more than one person was responsible for multiple assets that were compromised during the 1980's through the 1990's. Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen have been viewed as the largest threats to United States national security during their time. Because of the betrayal by these employees, higher standards in counterintelligence defensive security and offensive actions have been imposed

References

CIA Historical Review Program. (1993, Sept 22). Counterintelligence for National Security. Retrieved from CIA Historical Review Program: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a10p_0001.htm

Fine, G. A. (2003, August 14). A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, andInvestigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen. Retrieved from Office of the Inspector General: https://online.national.edu/content/enforced/59287-149248/Course_Resources/Review_of_FBI_Performance_in_Investigating_the_Espionage_Activities_of_Robert_Hanssen.pdf?_&d2lSessionVal=gmD4BrSkJdA3OfLptXqf7c1AX&ou=59287

Maas, P. (1995). Killer Spy. New York: Warner Books, Inc.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (1994, November 1). An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and ItsImplications for U.S. Intelligence. Retrieved from Congressional Documents: https://online.national.edu/content/enforced/59287-149248/Course_Resources/An_Assessment_of_the_Aldrich_Ames_Espionage_Case_and_Its_Implications_for_U.S._Intelligence_-_Senate_Select_Committee_on_Int.pdf?_&d2lSessionVal=W2B4twzj07b9Q62aRajEf9dTR&ou=59287

Shannon, E. &. (2002). The Spy Next Door. New York: Little, Brown and Company.

Tavernise, S. (2002, July 23). Edward Lee Howard, 50, Spy who escaped to Soviet Haven. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/23/world/edward-lee-howard-50-spy-who-escaped-to-soviet-haven.html

Vise, D. A. (2002). The Bureau and the Mole: The Unmasking of Robert Philip Hanssen, the Most Dangerous Double Agent in FBI History. Open Road & Grove Atlantic.

Wise, D. (1986, November 2). The Spy Who Got Away. Retrieved from The New York Times Magazine/ CIA Library: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000807500008-7.pdf

CIA Historical Review Program. (1993, September 22). Counterintelligence for National Security. Retrieved from CIA Historical Review Program: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a10p_0001.htm

Fine, G. A. (2003, August 14). A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, andInvestigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen. Retrieved from Office of the Inspector General: https://online.national.edu/content/enforced/59287-149248/Course_Resources/Review_of_FBI_Performance_in_Investigating_the_Espionage_Activities_of_Robert_Hanssen.pdf?_&d2lSessionVal=gmD4BrSkJdA3OfLptXqf7c1AX&ou=59287

Maas, P. (1995). Killer Spy. New York: Warner Books, Inc.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (1994, November 1). An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and ItsImplications for U.S. Intelligence. Retrieved from Congressional Documents: https://online.national.edu/content/enforced/59287-149248/Course_Resources/An_Assessment_of_the_Aldrich_Ames_Espionage_Case_and_Its_Implications_for_U.S._Intelligence_-_Senate_Select_Committee_on_Int.pdf?_&d2lSessionVal=W2B4twzj07b9Q62aRajEf9dTR&ou=59287

Shannon, E. &. (2002). The Spy Next Door. New York: Little, Brown and Company.

Tavernise, S. (2002, July 23). Edward Lee Howard, 50, Spy who escaped to Soviet Haven. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/23/world/edward-lee-howard-50-spy-who-escaped-to-soviet-haven.html

Vise, D. A. (2002). The Bureau and the Mole: The Unmasking of Robert Philip Hanssen, the Most Dangerous Double Agent in FBI History. Open Road & Grove Atlantic.

Wise, D. (1986, November 2). The Spy Who Got Away. Retrieved from The New York Times Magazine/ CIA Library: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000807500008-7.pdf