COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES

• Apply methods and procedures unique to the development and use of double agents in clandestine operations.
• Distinguish between various intelligence deception techniques and modalities in field operations.
• Conceptualize and plan realistic operations using deception techniques and modalities.
• Understand and apply deception techniques in different hostile environments and Employ accurate, brief, and clear English prose.
• Demonstrate techniques for clear writing and constructive editing.

Double Cross System

Rachael Riggs

National American University

INT551: Double Agents, Denial, and Deception

Dr. John Lervold

August 2021

Double Cross System

The Double-Cross System induced by the British against Germany proved highly effective and advantageous (Macintyre, 2012). Multiple reasons remain for what made the Double-Cross system, otherwise known as XX, so effective. Most notably, the British had the capability to decipher German encrypted Enigma communications for most of the war (Masterman, 2012). The ability of the British to read nearly all German war communication was the most powerful secret that enabled the British to complete all further missions successfully (Masterman, 2012).

By intercepting encrypted enigma communications, the British could discover agents' identities sent by Germany before their arrival, aiding in their expeditious capture(Macintyre, 2012). With the abduction of these agents, the British would then interrogate and determine their suitability as double agents to spy for the British Secret Intelligence Service against Germany. (Macintyre, 2012) Using this system, Britain could turn almost all the active German agents (Macintyre, 2012) (Masterman, 2012). Agents that were deemed unsuitable were killed or imprisoned. (Macintyre, 2012)

In addition to the communications they had already been receiving, they also discovered the radio communication signals Germany was using (Budiansky, 2009); they identified "frequencies, time of day, and message headings." (Budiansky, 2009) Codebreakers gained the ability to decipher most of the German radio communications accurately. (Budiansky, 2009)

Another advantage the British had over the Germans was that because they could decrypt and read much of the German's communications, they could then send out misleading information to cause confusion and, at the same time, witness via their communications if the information was accepted as truth. (Macintyre, 2012) The false reporting would ultimately help win the war, ensuring the success of the landing in Normandy. (Budiansky, 2009)

Combining all of this in a masterfully skilled way, the British Secret Intelligence Service could:

• realize what the Germans had planned and plan accordingly to it
• know the identities of the German agents
• determine how and where the agents would land
• capture and turn their agents into very successful double agents
• utilize their own system of double agents
• send misleading and false reports to the Germans

"Ultimately creating an entire system of deception that allowed Britain to win the war against Germany" (Masterman, 2012).

Even with all the advantages seen by the British, they still could not have accomplished all of this had the Germans discovered they were working with double agents and that Germany's own agents had turned against the Abwehr (Masterman, 2012). Even when agents were dangled in front of them to lead them to the idea that an agent was, in fact, a double agent, the Germans never concluded that their agents were working against them. (Masterman, 2012) For whatever reason, the Germans had complete trust in their agents and never suspected that they were being controlled by the British. (Masterman, 2012)

British Intelligence Officer John Masterman orchestrated this entire system of deception. Masterman oversaw the group of double agents, with the ultimate goal being "to lull the Abwehr into complacency while preparing for the big sting" (Budiansky, 2009). As we know, this plan worked fabulously. In May of 1945, Masterman gives credit for the success of this operation to codebreaker Dilly Knox, stating in his final report as chairman of the Twenty Committee, "None of this would have been possible without the Enigma decrypts; it was vital to double-cross work" (Budiansky, 2009) (Masterman, 2012).

References

Budiansky, S. (2009, May). HistoryNET. Retrieved from The Art of the Double Cross: https://www.historynet.com/art-double-cross.htm

Macintyre, B. (2012). Double Cross. New York: Broadway Paperbacks.

Masterman, J. (2012). The Double Cross System. Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press.